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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : BRIEF ON APPEAL 
vs. : 
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, ET AL, : Case No, 890217 
Defendants/Respondents: 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This was an action sounding in tort which alleged 
assault, battery, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment 
that was originally filed by the Plaintiff as an action against 
three (3) police officers from three (3) different jurisdictions, 
that happened at the Plaintiff's home on the late evening hours 
of August 28, 1983 and continued into the early morning hours of 
August 29, 1983. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Following the filing of a Notice of Readiness of Trial, 
after discovery had been completed and immediately prior to a 
Trial which had been set, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
the basis of violation of the statute of limitations. 
In a hearing on September 14, 1987, Plaintiff's claims 
against the Defendant Cities were dismissed by Stipulation and 
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the Court agreed to consider at a later hearing, Plaintiff's 
request to amend her Complaint to include claims for false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution which would defeat 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as against the Officers 
on the basis of a statute of limitation violation. 
A proposed Amended Complaint was prepared alleging both 
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims and alleging 
that those claims arose from a continuous act, beginning on 
August 28, 198 3 continuing through August 29, 1983 and 
thereafter. (See Record on Appeal, Plaintiff's Proposed Amended 
Complaint) 
At the subsequent hearing on November 2, 1987, the Motion 
to Amend the Complaint was denied and the Defendants were granted 
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on the basis that the 
claim against the police officers, pursuant to Rule 63-30-13, 
which had been filed on August 29, 1984 were not timely filed. 
An appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court which 
transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. Following 
the presentation of Briefs and Oral Argument, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, on March 30, 1989, entered an Order of Affirmance in a 
two-to-one hearing, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Appendix "1". Justices Jackson and Greenwood merely affirmed the 
Judgment of the Trial Court on the basis that the Notice of Claim 
made against the Defendants was not timely filed. Justice Newey 
dissented and argued that the Trial Court should have allowed the 
Complaint to be amended to include claims of false imprisonment 
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and malicious prosecution and that the Court abused its 
discretion in rejecting such Complaint. 
A request to file an extension for a Writ of Certiorari 
was filed and granted on April 27, 1989 and the Certiorari 
Petition was filed on May 26, 1989 and this Court granted the 
Petition and the Record on Appeal was filed on September 8, 1989. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Rule 43 of the Supreme Court Rules, State . of Utah, in that a 
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case has rendered a 
decision that has so departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower Court as to call for an exercise of this Court's power 
of supervision. 
That this Court can, by the granting of a Petition of 
Certiorari, review said decision. Said Petition for Certiorari 
having been granted, the Court now has jurisdiction to consider 
the case on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in not 
granting Plaintiff's request to amend her Complaint prior to 
Trial to defeat the Defendants' statute of limitation argument, 
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Ruled of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(The following fact statement is taken from the pleadings 
in the case, including Plaintiff's Affidavit and Memorandum 
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supplied at the time of the Summary Judgment Hearing. There has 
been no evidentiary hearing in the case and therefore, citations 
will not be to a transcript, but to various documents in the 
Record on Appeal. The facts set forth below however, are based 
upon the allegations contained in those pleadings.) 
In the late evening hours of August 28, 198 3 at 
approximately 10:30 p.m., Plaintiff, along with other friends 
was returning to her home in Washington Terrace, Weber County, 
Utah, from a boating excursion at Pineview Reservoir, East of 
Ogden. 
At that time, Plaintiff was a passenger of a motorhome, 
driven by her boyfriend, Jerry Wells. The motorhome was owned 
by, and registered to, him. 
That upon entering Washington Terrace City, a Washington 
Terrace police officer pulled behind the motorhome as it stopped 
and parked in front of the Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff exited 
the motorhome and entered her home. 
Shortly thereafter, the officers began to arrest both 
Jerry Wells and Charlie Schultz, for driving while intoxicated 
and public intoxication. The Washington Terrace officer 
apparently called for assistance from officers from South Ogden 
City and Riverdale City. 
The named officers in the Complaint then entered the 
Plaintiff's home, without knocking and without any authorization 
and requested that she move the motorhome. After informing the 
officers that the motorhome did not belong to her, a verbal 
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argument ensued, at which time the Plaintiff refused to move the 
motorhome or leave her house. The officers drug her from her 
home to the porch and onto the driveway area where she was 
physically beaten and abused. 
At this time, Plaintiff was not arrested, but was then 
transported by the officers to McKay Dee Hospital approximately 
ten (10) miles away. Plaintiff was not released from McKay Dee 
Hospital until 1:00 a.m. on the morning of August 29, 1983. 
Following her release, she was then arrested, handcuffed and 
placed into a patrol car and taken to the Weber County Jail in 
Ogden where she was booked at approximately 1:30 a.m. on a number 
of charges including resisting arrest, interfering with an 
officer and disturbing the peace. Plaintiff remained 
incarcerated in the Weber County Jail until she was able to 
arrange bail at approximately 8:00 a.m. on August 29, 1983. 
The officers then contacted the Washington Terrace City 
Attorney who caused Informations to be filed on Misdemeanor 
Counts for the above referenced charges. 
The Plaintiff initially plead not guilty to all charges 
and some two (2) months later, all charges, but one, was 
dismissed through a plea bargain. The only charge to which 
Plaintiff plead guilty was disorderly conduct and there was no 
agreement on the part of the Plaintiff that she would not take 
legal action against the City, the various police agencies or the 
officers involved. Nor was there any factual determination by 
the Court that the charge of Disorderly Conduct justified any of 
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the officers' action. 
The Plaintiff initially filed her Notice of Claim against 
all the Cities and named officers in this case on August 29, 
1984. Plaintiff contended that none of the parties had 
specifically responded, either affirmatively or negatively, to 
the Notice of Claim and the lawsuit was initiated on November 27, 
1985. Answers were filed on behalf of the three (3) named 
officers and the Cities and the matter proceeded to Trial. 
Discovery ensued and Interrogatories were submitted which 
were answered by the Plaintiff and numerous settlement 
discussions were entertained, but none came to fruition for a 
period of almost two (2) years. At this time, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Readiness of Trial. No objection to the Trial was 
raised, nor were any Motions made following discovery. 
Approximately three (3) weeks before the Trial, the 
Defendants, for the first time, filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment claiming that the statute of limitations had been 
violated. The basis of the claim was that the gravamen of the 
lawsuit was the actual assault on Plaintiff by Defendants which 
occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. on August 28th and 
therefore, the Notice of Claim was one (1) day late. 
Plaintiff took the position at the initial hearing on 
September 14, 1987 that she considered the incident as one (1) 
continuous tort beginning in the late evening hours and 
continuing until the Plaintiff's release from jail at 8:00 on the 
morning of the 29th. 
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Plaintiff further requested that she be allowed to amend 
her Complaint to conform to the facts, including the offenses of 
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution which clearly took 
place on August 29th and subsequent thereto. 
The Court took this matter under advisement and allowed 
the Plaintiff to prepare and Amended Complaint. Plaintiff then 
filed an Amended Complaint and at that time, the Judge after 
reviewing the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint refused to accept it, 
claiming that it changed the basis of the lawsuit and further 
found that the conduct, although beginning on August 2 8th and 
continued to August 29th was not of such continuous tortious 
nature that it could be brought into the suit and considered a 
single act. 
Therefore, the Court determined that the matters raised 
in the initial Complaint were completed on August 28, 1983 and 
therefore, the claim was outside the statute and Summary Judgment 
was granted. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court Judge erred in refusing to allow the 
Plaintiff to amend her Complaint prior to the Trial to conform to 
the facts to include a malicious prosecution and false 
imprisonment, which claims were either part of a continuous 
tortuous act or took place on August 29, 1983 or beyond, which 
would have brought them within the one (1) year Notice of Claim 
filing. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
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amendment of a Complaint prior to Trial to conform to the 
evidence by leave of Court and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. 
In this case justice required the amendment of the 
pleading to allow Plaintiff's legitimate claims against three (3) 
police officers to be heard in a full evidentiary hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, IN THAT THE MAJORITY 
FAILED TO ADDRESS THE KEY ISSUE RAISED IN THE 
APPEAL, WHICH WAS THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
ALLOW THE AMENDMENT TO PLEADINGS WHICH WOULD HAVE 
BROUGHT THE ACTION WITHIN THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD ON THE BASIS THAT SUCH A 
DECISION DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL 
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
This is a case in which the Plaintiff is being denied 
access to the Courts for a redress of grievance on the basis of a 
very strict view of both the construction of pleadings and a 
definition of tortious conduct by a Trial Court Judge. 
It was unrefuted in this case and in any of the prior 
pleadings, documents, or memoranda that was presented to the 
Trial Judge that the Defendant police officers began a course of 
conduct in the late evening hours of August 28, 1983 which also 
continued into the early morning hours of August 29, 1983. That 
conduct consisted of dragging the Plaintiff from her home and 
beating her at approximately 10:30 p.m. on August 28, 1983, then 
transporting her to the McKay Dee Hospital to be treated for her 
injuries, removing her from the McKay Dee Hospital at 
approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 29, 1983, placing her under 
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arrest, taking her to the Weber County Jail and booking her in 
the jail at approximately 1:30 a.m. August 29, 1983. Plaintiff 
was released from the jail at approximately 8:30 a.m. on August 
29, 1983 and then was charged with various misdemeanor offenses 
which resulted in Court action thereafter. 
There is also no question that the police officers set in 
motion a sequence of events, that while they began on August 28, 
1983, extended far beyond that time, if they are viewed as a 
continuous act. A Notice of Claim filed in this case on August 
29, 1984 and for any acts that took place on August 29, 1984 or 
thereafter, or any acts which began on August 28, 1983 and by 
their nature, continued beyond that date would be timely and any 
statute of limitations argument that was raised in this case 
would be moot. 
The entire focus therefore, before the Trial Court in two 
(2) separate hearings approximately three (3) weeks prior to 
Trial was whether the specific allegations of Plaintiff's 
original Complaint (the assault and battery) which clearly took 
place on the 28 th could extend, by the virtue of the other 
actions taken by those same officers as a single tortious act to 
the 29th, or whether the Plaintiff should simply be allowed amend 
the Complaint to allege the other specific acts which naturally 
flowed from the officers original conduct and which obviously 
took place on August 29, 1983. 
The Court was asked to consider both propositions and 
denied Plaintiff her day in Court under either theory. The first 
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proposition, that of a continuous tortious act, has been 
addressed in at least two (2) other jurisdictions in the case of 
Shores v. Branch, 720 P.2d 239 (1986) a Montana case and the case 
of Baker v. Burbank, 705 P.2d 866 (1985) Cert, denied 475 US 1017 
(1986) a California case. 
While it is true and Defendants have constantly raised 
this issue, both in the Trial Court and in the Appellate Court, 
that these cases were civil cases and dealt with nuisance and 
easements, the language of the Court in both cases is compelling 
when applied to what happened here. 
In the Shores case, the Court held that, 
"continuing torts are those torts in which the tortious 
act can be readily abated." (Id at 243) 
In this case, if the officers conduct is viewed as a 
continuing series of actions, each of which may be somewhat 
different, but results in an ongoing course of conduct, it is 
clear that at any time it could have been readily abated. The 
officers, following the altercation at the home, could have left 
and stopped any further contact with the Plaintiff, or following 
her release from the hospital, the officers could have simply 
issued her a citation and let her return to her home. This action 
would have abated their prior conduct. 
However, they chose not to do this, but continued their 
conduct by taking the Plaintiff to the Weber County Jail and 
booking her. Even after Plaintiff was booked and released, the 
officers could have dismissed the case or not filed the case 
through the City Attorney and conclude the matter at that point. 
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They chose not to do this, but continued the conduct in causing 
charges to be filed and causing the Plaintiff to be prosecuted. 
Any of these acts therefore, could have been abated at any time 
and were one continuing course of conduct. Thus, the conduct 
clearly fits within the Shores definition. 
The Court in Baker said, 
"The classic example of a continuing nuisance 
(tort), is an ongoing or repeated disturbance.11 
(Id at 870) 
The actions here were clearly ongoing and repeated. We 
begin on August 28, 1983 with the officers entering the 
Plaintiff's home. They continued by taking her from her home, 
then committing an assault, taking her to a hospital, then 
transporting her to a jail, having her incarcerated and then 
prosecuting her. An ongoing repeated series of events, although 
criminal rather than civil in nature, clearly fitting within the 
continuous tort concept. 
In essence, what actually happened on August 28-29, 1983, 
is a continual sequence of activities, each of which was tortious 
and each of which, when combined with the other, constituted an 
overall violation of this Plaintiff's fundamental rights as a 
human being. 
To suggest that because one of the acts happened on 
August 28th and that therefore, the Court should ignore whatever 
happened on August 29th, to deprive this Plaintiff from access to 
a full evidentiary hearing, is ludicrous and should not have been 
condoned by the Court of Appeals and certainly should not be 
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sanctioned by this Court. 
It is interesting that in the Trial Court's decision, it 
gave no specific reason for not adopting the continual tort view, 
but simply denied the approach. It is also interesting that the 
Court of Appeals did not address this issue, but simply stated 
that the Notice of Claim was not timely filed. 
What is even more compelling however, is the Court's 
failure to allow Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to allege 
specific incidents of tortious conduct that clearly happened on 
August 29th, particularly, the false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution claims. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads as 
follows: 
"A party may amend his pleading once as a matter 
of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served, or if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
action has not been placed upon the Trial 
calendar, he may so amend it in time within 
twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
Court of by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." (Emphasis added) 
This Court has continuously held that amendments to 
pleadings, even during the Trial of the case should be allowed in 
order to afford all parties an opportunity to be heard on the 
merits and secure an appropriate remedy. 
The Court is directed to its own case of 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P. 2d 245 (1983 Utah) that was rendered 
even before the most recent amendments to the Rules of Civil 
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Procedure in which this Court specifically took the position that 
Trial Courts should be extremely lenient and liberal in allowing 
amendments to pleadings, unless they would do violence to the 
process or unduly prejudice one party or another. 
The recent revision of Rule 15 as set forth above even 
more clearly delineates this broad public policy consideration. 
In this case, there was no prejudice to the Defendants as 
they had been aware for some two (2) years prior to the Motion to 
Amend of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest 
of the Plaintiff and in fact, the record is completely void of 
any claim by the Defendants of surprise or prejudice that would 
have arisen had the Court granted the Motion. They never raised 
this in their pleadings at the lower Court and did not address it 
in their Brief to the Court of Appeals. 
It is also clear, contrary to the Defendants position in 
their Brief in Opposition to Appellant's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, the unlawful arrest did not necessarily take place on 
August 28th. The Plaintiff was simply detained by the police 
officers and taken to a hospital. She was not arrested until she 
was taken from the hospital to the Weber County Jail, where she 
was booked into the jail. This was when the actual arrest took 
place, which was clearly on August 29th. 
What is interesting however, is that even if Defendants' 
allegations are true, that he actual "arrest" took place on 
August 28th, it clearly continued to August 29th as other 
requirements were necessary to complete the arrest, to-wit: 
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handcuffing, transporting to the jail and booking into the jail, 
all of which took place on the 29th. Therefore, under either 
theory, a direct action or a continuous tort, August 29, 1983, 
would have been within the statute of limitations period. 
With respect to the malicious prosecution claim, 
Defendants claim has been that because Plaintiff eventually plead 
to one misdemeanor count, that this defeats any malicious 
prosecution claim. Of course, they have never cited any legal 
basis for this argument, because in fact, there is none. The 
malicious prosecution stems from the fact that charges were filed 
at all in the light of the actual conduct that took place. 
The fact that Plaintiff was forced to obtain an attorney 
and fight the case and then resolve it is simply part of the 
malicious prosecution allegation. Her plea also did not involve 
an agreement not to sue or a factual agreement that the officers 
had probable cause to bring any action whatsoever and this was 
clearly delineated at the time the plea was taken. 
Therefore, the Trial Court simply for some unknown 
reason, determined that this Plaintiff would not be allowed an 
opportunity to factually present her case and obtain a remedy. 
That is the real tragedy of the District Court's decision that 
was further exacerbated by the decision of the Appellate Court. 
The najority of the Appellate Court, in a one line affirmance, 
simply indicated that the Notice of Claim was not timely filed, 
without addressing the two (2) principal issues that were raised. 
Judge Newey however, in his dissent, specifically focuses 
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on the issue of the amendment of pleadings and found that such an 
amendment should have been allowed and the case should have 
proceeded to Trial. 
This Court, in granting the Petition for Certiorari, at 
least found the threshold argument that this decision has 
departed from common practice in the District Courts below to 
liberally allow amendments to pleadings. 
This Court therefore, is specifically requested to review 
the entire record on this case in accordance with the issues that 
were raised in both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court and 
to adopt the dissenting view of Judge Newey, which this Plaintiff 
believes is the correct view of the law in this case and allow 
Plaintiff to have her day in Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in this case in failing to either 
consider that under the totality of the circumstances that the 
conduct of the officers on August 29th was part of a continuous 
tortious act beginning on August 28th, or allowing the Plaintiff 
to specifically amend her Complaint to reflect specific incidents 
of conduct on the 2 9th, either of which would have rendered the 
statute of limitations argument moot. 
The majority of the Appellate Court further compounded 
the error by failing to address those two (2) issues. The 
dissenting opinion of Judge Newey addressed the issue and 
correctly resolved it based upon the current status of the law in 
this case and it is respectfully requested that his view be 
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adopted by this Court in its review of the Appellate Court 
decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd d ^ o f November,_ 198j 
T. CAINI 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Brief on Appeal to counsel for the 
Respondents, Joy L. Sanders and Andrew M. Morse, Attorneys at 
Law, 10 Exchange Place, P.O. Box 45000, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145 and Dale J. Lambert, Attorney at Law, 175 South 
West Temple, Clark Learning Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid this 3rd day of November, 1989. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Virginia Yearsley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Officer Dean Jensen, Officer 
Steven Wallerstein, and 
Officer Steven Smith, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Newey (Retired Juvenile Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The order and judgment of the trial court is affirmed because 
the notice of claim made against defendants, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1986), was not timely filed. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
flrorman H. J^efkson, Judge 
Newey, Judge dissenting: 
I dissent because, in my view, the actions upon which 
plaintiff has sued continued from August 28th into August 29, 1983, 
on the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims. The 
notice of claim filed under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1986) should 
be liberally construed to include the issues plaintiff raised in her 
proposed amended complaint and was, therefore, timely. Based upon 
that notice of claim, the trial court abused its discretion in 
rejecting the proposed amended complaint. Consequently, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880145-CA 
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Dale J. Lambert 
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Second District 
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